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This document contains a number of omitted proofs and a more "formal" proof of the main theorem
of the paper "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms."
1. Omitted and Detailed Proofs for the Case that T = 2
Proof of Proposition 2










where = = fp : [a;b] ! [0;1] , increasingg:
Step 1a. (Sequential Compactness) In order to show sequential compactness of = we will refer to
the following results.
Theorem (pointwise convergence) A sequence pn of functions from X to W converges to a function
p in the topology of pointwise convergence1 if and only if for each s 2 X(= [a;b] in our problem),
1
De￿nition 1 (Topology of pointwise convergence.) Given a point x of [0,1] and an open set U of space [0,1] let
S(x;U) =
n
p j p 2 [0;1]
[0;1] and p(x) 2 U
o
The sets S(x;U) are a subbasis for a topology on [0,1]
[0;1] which is called the topology of pointwise convergence. The typical
basis element about a function p consists of all functions g that are close to p at ￿nitely many points.
1the sequence pn(s) of points of W(= [0;1] in our problem) converges to the point p(s): (For a proof
see Munkres ￿Topology: A ￿rst Course￿page 281.)
Let fpng be a sequence of elements of =: Then, from Helly￿ s Selection Principle, (see Kolmogorov and
Fomin p. 372), it follows that there exists p 2 = and a subsequence of fpng that converges pointwise to p:
From the previous Theorem it also follows that there exists p 2 = and a subsequence of fpng that converges
to p: Hence every sequence in = has a convergent subsequence. It follows that = is sequentially compact.2
Step 1b. (Continuity) We want to show that the objective function is continuous on = in the topology
of pointwise convergence. In order to accomplish this we will use Lebesque￿ s Dominated Convergence
Theorem.
Theorem (Lebesque￿ s Dominated Convergence Theorem). Let g be a measurable function over
a measurable set E, and suppose that fhng is a sequence of measurable functions on E such that
jhn(s)j ￿ g(s)







(For a proof see Royden (1962) p.76.)




^ g = sup
s2[a;b]
jp(s)[1 ￿ F(s)]j.
Note that g; ^ g are measurable, since they are constant functions, and g; and respectively ^ g; is an upper
bound for every function
h(s) = p(s)s and ^ h(s) = p(s)[1 ￿ F(s)]:
2
De￿nition 2 (Sequential Compactness). A topological space X is said to be sequentially compact if every in￿nite sequence
from X has a convergent subsequence.
2Observe that h and ^ h are measurable functions: Take hn(s) = pn(s)s and ^ hn(s) = pn(s)(1 ￿ F(s)) and
























is continuous in pn:
Step 1c. We now demonstrate that a bounded and continuous function over a sequentially compact
set has a maximum. First note that R(p) is bounded by b. Let ￿ R = supp2= R(p) and let pn be a sequence
in = such that
R(pn) ￿ ￿ R ￿
1
n
; n 2 N:
Since = is sequentially compact, every sequence has a convergent subsequence, therefore fpngn2N; has
a convergent subsequence, fpn(1)gn(1)2N; that converges to ￿ p: Since R is continuous at ￿ p; we have that
R(￿ p) = limn(1)!1 R(pn(1)) = ￿ R: Hence the maximum exists.
Step 2. We now proceed to show that the maximizer is of the form
pz(s) =
(
1 if s ￿ z
0 if s < z:
(1)
The objective function is linear in the choice variable so the maximizer will be an extreme point of the set
of =. The set of extreme points of = is
K = [z2[a;b]pz
where pz is de￿ned in (1).
Every increasing, non-negative function p with p(b) = 1 can be written as a convex combination of





3Let p￿ be a maximizer of the problem de￿ned in (4), in the main text. Let R￿ denote the maximum value

















































This is a convex combination of functions of the form given in (1). Hence one of these functions is a
maximizer.
Step 3. Now we turn to show that the optimal cuto⁄ is given by
v￿ ￿ inf
￿








￿ 0; for all ~ v 2 [v;b]
￿
(2)
First note that v￿ is well-de￿ned because the set
￿








￿ 0; for all ~ v 2 [v;b]
￿
is non-empty since it contains b. Suppose that v￿ does not characterize the optimal mechanism when
T = 1: With some abuse of notation, let R(v￿) denote the seller￿ s expected revenue given an allocation
rule described by (1) with cuto⁄ v￿. If v￿ is not optimal then there exists another cut-o⁄ ~ v such that
R(~ v) > R(v￿):






[1 ￿ F(s)]ds < 0: (3)




0 ￿ sdF(s) ￿
Z ~ v
a














3Actually, from the de￿nition of v
￿ it follows that there exists ^ v 2 [v
0;b] such that
R ^ v
v0 ￿(t)dt < 0: A moment￿ s thought will
reveal that we can take ^ v ￿ v
￿ without any loss.




0 ￿ sdF(s) ￿
Z ~ v
a
0 ￿ [1 ￿ F(s)]ds +
Z v0
~ v
0 ￿ sdF(s) ￿
Z v0
~ v







[1 ￿ F(s)]ds = R(v0);
clearly ~ v cannot be optimal.




0 ￿ sdF(s) ￿
Z v￿
a
0 ￿ [1 ￿ F(s)]ds +
Z ~ v
v￿
0 ￿ sdF(s) ￿
Z ~ v
v￿
















0 ￿ sdF(s) ￿
Z v￿
a













[1 ￿ F(s)]ds = R(v￿);
contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4 (Detailed)
Consider a PBE assessment (￿;￿) and let p denote the allocation rule implemented by it. Let s denote
an action that leads to (r;z), where this is the contract with the smallest \r", with the property that type
a is either "choosing" (r;z) with strictly positive probability at t = 1; or is indi⁄erent between doing and
not doing so. Also let Y denote the set of types of the buyer that report message ￿ and choose s at t = 1
with strictly positive probability, and let [a; ￿ v]; with a ￿ ￿ v; denote its convex hull. From the solution for
T = 1 we have that after the history that the buyer reported message ￿, chose action s; and no trade took
place at t = 1; the seller will maximize revenue by posting a price in period t = 2. Let us call this price as
z2 and de￿ne
vL = inf fv 2 Y s.t. v accepts z2 at 2g
vH = supfv 2 Y s.t. v accepts z2 at 2g:
By de￿nition types vL and vH either choose (r;z) at t = 1 and accept z2 at t = 2 with positive probability
or are indi⁄erent between this sequence of actions and the actions that they are actually choosing.
5First we show that for v 2 (vL;vH) we have that p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿; then we establish that z2 = vL
and ￿nally we show that for v 2 (a;vL) we have that p(v) = r:
Step 1: For v 2 (vL;vH); where vL 6= vH we have that p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿: Suppose not, then
there exists v 2 (vL;vH) such that p(v) 6= r + (1 ￿ r)￿; that is it is either a) p(v) > r + (1 ￿ r)￿ or b)
p(v) < r + (1 ￿ r)￿: If p(v) > r + (1 ￿ r)￿ then type v must be choosing with positive probability a
sequence of actions that implement ^ p; ^ x such that ^ p > r + (1 ￿ r)￿. At a PBE the buyer￿ s strategy must
be a best response hence it must be the case that ^ pv ￿ ^ x ￿ (r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1)v ￿ z ￿ (1 ￿ r)￿z2: But now
since ^ p > r + (1 ￿ r)￿ it follows that ^ pvH ￿ ^ x > (r + (1 ￿ r)￿)vH ￿ z ￿ (1 ￿ r)￿z2; contradicting the fact
that vH chooses (r;z) with positive probability or is indi⁄erent between doing and not doing so: Now if
p(v) < r + (1 ￿ r)￿ then type v is choosing at t = 1 with positive probability a sequence of actions that
implement ^ p; ^ x such that ^ p < r + (1 ￿ r)￿ and because at a PBE the buyer￿ s strategy is a best response
then we have that ^ pv ￿ ^ x ￿ (r +(1￿r)￿)v ￿z ￿(1￿r)￿z2: But now since ^ p < r +(1￿r)￿ and vL < v it
follows that ^ pvL ￿ ^ x > (r + (1 ￿ r)￿)vL ￿ z ￿ (1 ￿ r)￿z2; contradicting the fact that vL chooses (r;z) with
positive probability or is indi⁄erent between doing and not doing so:
Step 2 : We show that the smallest type that accepts z2 must be equal to it:vL = z2: First observe
that the fact that at a PBE the buyer￿ s strategy must be a best response to the seller￿ s strategy implies
that
(r + (1 ￿ r)￿)vL ￿ (z + (1 ￿ r)￿z2) ￿ rvL ￿ z:
We now show that this inequality must hold with equality. We argue by contradiction. Suppose not, that
is
(r + (1 ￿ r)￿)vL ￿ (z + (1 ￿ r)￿z2) > rvL ￿ z:
then the seller can increase z2 by ￿z such that
(r + (1 ￿ r)￿)vL ￿ (z + (1 ￿ r)￿z2) ￿ ￿z = rvL ￿ z;
and raise higher revenue at the continuation game that starts at 2: All types v ￿ vL still prefer to choose
(1;z2) at t = 2 then to choose (0;0): Hence at a PBE we have that
(r + (1 ￿ r)￿)vL ￿ (z + (1 ￿ r)￿z2) = rvL ￿ z; (4)
from which it is immediate that vL = z2:
Step 3: For v 2 (a;vL); where a 6= vL we have that p(v) = r: Suppose not, then there exists v 2 (a;vL)
such that p(v) 6= r; that is it is either a) p(v) > r or b) p(v) < r: If p(v) > r then type v must be choosing
with positive probability a sequence of actions that implement ^ p; ^ x such that ^ p > r. At a PBE the buyer￿ s
6strategy must be a best response hence it must be the case that ^ pv ￿ ^ x ￿ rv ￿ z: But now since ^ p > r it
follows that ^ pvL ￿ ^ x > rvL ￿ z; but from (4) we have that ^ pvL ￿ ^ x > (r + (1 ￿ r)￿)vL ￿ (z + (1 ￿ r)￿z2)
contradicting the fact that vL chooses (r;z) at t = 1 and (1;z2) at t = 2 with positive probability: Now if
p(v) < r then type v is choosing at t = 1 with positive probability a sequence of actions that implement
^ p; ^ x such that ^ p < r and because at a PBE the buyer￿ s strategy is a best response then we have that
^ pv ￿ ^ x ￿ rv ￿ z: But now since ^ p < r and a < v it follows that ^ pa ￿ ^ x > ra ￿ z; contradicting the fact
that a chooses (r;z) with positive probability or is indi⁄erent between doing and not doing so:
From Steps 1-3 it follows that p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿ for v 2 (vL;vH); and p(v) = r; for v 2 (a;vL) where
vL = z2: Hence the allocation rule is
p(v) = r for v 2 [a; ^ z2)
r ￿ p(^ z2) ￿ r + (1 ￿ r)￿
p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿ for v 2 (^ z2; ￿ v)
r + (1 ￿ r)￿ ￿ p(￿ v) ￿ 1
:
Note that p(a) cannot be strictly less then r by the de￿nition of (r;z); (in order for p(a) ￿ r it must be the
case that type a is choosing a sequence of actions that implement ^ p < r; but this contradicts the de￿nition
of (r;z) which is the smallest \r￿ contract that type a chooses with positive probability at t = 1):
An Alternative Proof of the Main Result
We start by verifying that the maximum of R over P￿
2 and P2 indeed exists: In order to prove existence
of a maximum we must establish that the spaces of functions P2 and P￿
2 are sequentially compact and the
objective function is continuous in the same topology.
Lemma A 8 The maximum of R over P2 and over P￿
2 exists.
Proof. We will prove that the maximum of R over P2 exists. Using an identical procedure one can show
that the maximum of R over P￿
2 exists. The proof will be done for the case that the game lasts for two
periods. All the arguments are valid, with more complicated notation, for the case that T > 2:
Continuity. Continuity of R follows from an identical argument as the one used in Step 1b, in the
proof of Proposition 2.
In order to prove that the maximum exists it remains to demonstrate that P2 is sequentially compact
in the topology of pointwise convergence.
Sequential Compactness. We will ￿rst show that every sequence pn 2 P2, n 2 N has a subsequence
7that converges pointwise to p 2 P2. Recall that pn:[a;b] ! [0;1]; increasing and of the form
pn(v) = r for v 2 [a;zn
2);
pn(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿ for v 2 [zn
2; ￿ vn)
r + (1 ￿ r)￿ ￿ pn(v) ￿ 1 for v 2 [￿ vn;b]
;
with zn
2 ￿ z2(￿ vn); and where z2(￿ vn) is the optimal price at t = 2 given beliefs F2(v) =
F(v)
F(￿ vn): The inequality
zn
2 ￿ z2(￿ vn) follows from Lemmata 4 and 7 that can be found in the main text. Suppose that the limit of
￿ vn is ￿ v, (this limit exists since every bounded sequence has a convergent subsequence). From Lemma 2
we know that z2(￿ vn) is increasing in ￿ vn; and hence it is continuous in ￿ vn from the right, which guarantees
that
lim
n!1z2(￿ vn) ￿ z2(￿ v):
Now for all n 2 N we have that
zn
2 ￿ z2(￿ vn);
let ^ z2 = limn!1 zn
2; (this limit exists because zn
2 is a bounded sequence), hence taking the limit as n ! 1
we get that
^ z2 ￿ lim
n!1z2(￿ vn) ￿ z2(￿ v):
Let w1;w2;:::: denote the rational points of [a;b]: Since pn is bounded, the sequence fpng has a subsequence,
fp
(1)
n g that converges at point w1: Since fp
(1)
n g is also bounded, it has a subsequence fp
(2)
n g converging at
the point w2 as well as the point w1; fp
(2)
n g contains a subsequence fp
(3)
n g that converges at point w3 as
well as at point w1 and w2 and so on. The ￿diagonal sequence￿ fhng = fp
(n)
n g will then converge to
every rational point of [a;b]: The limit of this subsequence, p; is an increasing function from [a;b] to [0;1].
Moreover p(s) = r for all the rationals in [a; ^ z2); and p(s) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿ for all the rationals in [^ z2; ￿ v): We
complete the de￿nition of p at the remaining points of [a;b] by setting4
p(v) = lim
v!w￿ p(w) if v is irrational.
The resulting function p is then the limit of fhng at every continuity point of p; (see Kolmogorov and
Fomin page 373). Since p is increasing it has at most countably many discontinuity points. Using the
diagonal process we can ￿nd a subsequence of fhng that converges to all the discontinuity points p, which
implies that it converges pointwise everywhere to p on [a;b]:
4The notation v ! w
￿ means that v approaches w from below.
8From the above arguments it follows that fpngn2N has a subsequence that converges pointwise to p
which is an increasing function, such that at ^ z2 its value jumps from r to r + (1 ￿ r)￿ and at ￿ v its value is
p(￿ v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿; in other words, p : [a;b] ! [0;1] is increasing and such that
p(v) = r for v 2 [a; ^ z2);
p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿ for v 2 [^ z2; ￿ v)
r + (1 ￿ r)￿ ￿ p(v) ￿ 1 for v 2 [￿ v;b]
with ^ z2 ￿ z2(￿ v):
Therefore p 2 P2.
From Theorem on pointwise convergence, (stated in the proof of Proposition 2), it follows that fpngn2N has
a subsequence that converges to p: Hence every in￿nite sequence in P2 has a convergent subsequence. There-
fore, P2 is sequentially compact. As seen in the proof of Proposition 2, Step 1c, a bounded continuous
function on a sequentially compact set has a maximum.
The following Lemma establishes that the allocation rules in P￿
2 are extreme points of the set P2.
Lemma A 9. Every allocation rule in P2 can be approximated arbitrarily closely, in the usual metric,
by a convex combination of elements of P￿
2.
Proof. We use p and q to denote generic elements of P2 and P￿
2 respectively. Every measurable function
can be approximated by a step function in the usual metric generated by the norm (see for instance Royden
1962). An element of P2, say p; can be therefore approximated by a step function g: We now show that
every step function that is arbitrarily close to an element of P2, can be written as a convex combination
of elements of P￿
2: Take a p 2 P2,
p(v) = r for v 2 [a; ^ z2);
p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿ for v 2 [^ z2; ￿ v)
r + (1 ￿ r)￿ ￿ p(v) ￿ 1 for v 2 [￿ v;b]
with ^ z2 ￿ z2(￿ v);
;
and a step function g; such that jp￿gj < "; " > 0 arbitrarily small. Since the restriction of p on [a; ￿ v) is a
step function, we can take p(t) = g(t); for t 2 [a; ￿ v): Suppose that in the interval [￿ v;b]; g has K steps. Then
we can consider the division of [￿ v;b]; into K subintervals, Ij; j = 1;:::;K: In each of these subintervals g
takes a potentially di⁄erent value gj; where r + (1 ￿ r)￿ ￿ gj ￿ b:
We now show that we can write g as a linear combination of L functions q1;:::;qL 2 P￿







is have the following characteristics
qi(v) = r; v 2 [a; ^ z2);
qi(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿; v 2 [^ z2; ^ vi);
qi(v) = 1;v 2 [^ vi;b];
where b ￿ ^ vi ￿ ￿ v and z2(^ vi) ￿ z2(￿ v) ￿ ^ z2; where ^ z2 and z2(￿ v) are the same as in the de￿nition of p.
The way to determine the coe¢ cients ￿i; is as follows. Suppose that for v 2 I1; g1 = g(v) = r +
(1 ￿ r)￿ + ￿1: Then for v 2 I1; we have g(v) = ￿L
i=2￿iqi + ￿1q1; where qi = r + (1 ￿ r)￿ for all i 6= 1
and q1 = 1, ￿1 =
￿1
1￿r￿(1￿r)￿; and of course ￿L
i=1￿i = 1: (Observe that since q1 = 1 on I1 it must be
q1 = 1 for v 2 Ij; j = 2;:::;K:) Obviously, ￿L
i=2￿i = 1 ￿ ￿1 =
1￿r￿(1￿r)￿￿￿1
1￿r￿(1￿r)￿ : So for v 2 I1; we can write
g(v) = ￿L










= r+(1￿r)￿+￿1: Now, suppose
that for v 2 I2; we have g2 = r+(1￿r)￿+￿1+￿2: Then for v 2 I2 we can write g(v) = ￿L
i=3￿iqi+￿1q1+￿2q2;






To verify this note that ￿L
i=3￿i = 1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2 =
1￿r￿(1￿r)￿￿￿1￿￿2
1￿r￿(1￿r)￿ . We therefore obtain, that for v 2 I2;
g(v) = ￿L
i=3￿iqi + ￿1q1 + ￿2q2















= r + (1 ￿ r)￿ + ￿1 + ￿2:
Continuing in a similar manner we can determine all the ￿0
is. It follows that any step function that is
arbitrarily close to an element of P2, can be written as a convex combination of elements of P￿
2: Therefore
for each p 2 P2 there exist a g; where g is a convex combination of elements of P￿
2; such that jp ￿ gj < ":
Proposition A 4 Consider a linear function R : P !R. Suppose that there exists a set P￿ ￿ P, such
that every element of P can be approximated by a convex combination of elements of P￿: Furthermore,










It is given, that every element of P can be arbitrarily closely approximated by a convex combination of
elements of P￿. We will use p and q to denote generic elements of P and P￿ respectively, and g to denote
convex combinations of elements of P￿: Suppose that ￿ p 2 P is a maximizer of R; and consider a sequence
10fgngn2N such that gn ! ￿ p: This implies that for all " > 0; there exists gn such that jR(gn)￿R(￿ p)j < "; for
n large enough: From this we get that, for n large enough either R(gn) > R(￿ p) ￿ " or R(￿ p) ￿ R(gn) ￿ ":
Fix an n large enough. Since gn is a convex combination of elements of P￿, we can rewrite each element
of this sequence as gn = ￿L
i=1￿n
i qn
i ; where qn
i 2 P￿ and ￿L
i=1￿n






Now suppose that R(qn
i ) < R(gn) for all i = 1;:::;L: Then we have that R(gn) = ￿L
i=1￿n
i R(qn
i ) < R(gn);
but this is impossible. Hence there must exist i such that R(qn
i ) ￿ R(gn): Now
max
P￿ R(p) ￿ R(qn
i ) ￿ R(gn);
where the ￿rst inequality follows from the fact that qn
i 2 P￿: If R(￿ p) > R(gn) then
max
P￿ R(p) ￿ R(qn
i ) ￿ R(gn) > R(￿ p) ￿ "; for all " > 0:
Taking the limit as " ! 0; we get that
max
P￿ R(p) = R(￿ g) = max
P
R(p):
If R(gn) ￿ R(￿ p); then from the fact that qn
i 2 P￿ and P￿ ￿ P; we have
R(￿ p) ￿ max
P￿ R(p) ￿ R(qn
i ) ￿ R(gn) ￿ R(￿ p);
which again implies that all inequalities hold with equality. We therefore get
max
P￿ R(p) = R(￿ p) = max
P
R(p):
Now we are ready to state the main result of the paper.
Theorem A 4 Under non-commitment the seller maximizes expected revenue by posting a price in
each period.
Proof. In Lemma A 8, we veri￿ed that the seller￿ s maximization problem is well de￿ned. From Lemma A
9 we know that an element of P2(r;z2(F2); ￿ v) can be written as a convex combination of elements of P￿
2:
The result follows from Proposition A 4 and Lemma A 9.
11